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CUMULATIVE VOTING AND CLASSIFIED
BOARDS: SOME REFLECTIONS ON
WOLFSON v. AVERY
I
ORIGIN OF CUMULATIVE VOTING IN
CORPORATE ELECTIONS
Cumulative voting in corporate elections was introduced
into American law through a provision in the constitution
of the State of Illinois that was adopted by the people in
the year 1870. At the time that the delegates to the consti-
tutional convention met, popular indignation at the ex-
cesses and frauds of various railroad managements was at
fever pitch.' The Erie scandal was fresh in mind. Self-
dealing by directors was as widespread as it was shameless.
In Illinois, then a predominantly agricultural state, the
popular dissatisfaction with railroads-in 1870 the princi-
pal type of publicly-owned corporations-and with their
managements was expressed through the Grange move-
1 For contemporary accounts of some of these frauds, especially the
fabulous Erie swindle, see HICKS, HIGH FWNxcE IN THE SixTIES passim




ment which was agitating for various financial reforms as
the delegates began assembling. How to curb the power of
the "rings" which ran the railroads and mulcted thousands
of small investors was an issue that was raised on the floor
of the convention almost as soon as the delegates took their
seats.
Giving minority shareholders representation on cor-
porate boards through the device of cumulative voting was
the brain child of delegate Joseph Medill, publisher of the
Chicago Tribune and a towering figure at the 1870 con-
vention in Illinois. Medill had been won over to the prin-
ciple of minority representation by the writings of John
Stuart Mill who in 1861, in his Representative Govern-
ment,2 had stated:
. . . Because the majority ought to prevail over the
minority, must the majority have all the votes, the
minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should
not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old associa-
tion can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless
injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any
section would be represented, not disporportionately,
but proportionately. A majority of the electors would
always have a majority of the representatives; but a
minority of the electors would always have a minority of
the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully
represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is
not equal government, but a government of inequality
and privilege: one part of the people rule over the
rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of in-
fluence in the representation is withheld from them;
contrary to all just government, but above all, contrary
to the principle of democracy, which professes equality
as its very root and foundation.
Mill, of course, was speaking of minority representation
in political matters. Medill and his group, however, saw
the usefulness of the principle in corporate elections. Soon
after the convention opened he introduced the cumulative
2 Mill, Representative Government, in 170 THE WORLD'S CLAssics 248-
249 (1948).
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voting provision for the election of corporate directors.
After an illuminating debate,3 Medill's draft with certain
insubstantial changes was adopted as the present article
XI, section 3 of the constitution and read as follows:'
The general assembly shall provide, by law, that
in all elections for directors or managers of incor-
porated companies, every stockholder shall have the
right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of
shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as
there are directors or managers to be elected, or to
cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many
votes as the number of directors multiplied, by the
number of his shares of stock shall equal, or to dis-
tribute them on the same principle among as many
candidates as he shall think fit; and such directors or




At this point straight voting and cumulative voting
should be distinguished. They proceed from altogether
divergent concepts of stockholder representation and em-
ploy different mechanics.
In straight voting, the type employed in the majority
of corporate elections, a shareholder votes the number of
shares he owns for each candidate for office. If nine
directors are to be elected and the shareholder owns 100
shares he may cast 100 votes for each of nine candidates.
Under straight voting, shareholders owning a majority of
51 per cent or more of the shares can elect all nine direc-
tors; the minority elects none.
3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDimS OF THE CONSTrnTIONAL CONVENTON OF TE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 1664-1667 (1870).
4 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
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Under cumulative voting a shareholder is entitled to as
many votes as he has shares multiplied by the number of
directors who are to be elected. He may concentrate all
of his votes on one candidate or distribute them among as
many candidates as he sees fit. Under this method of vot-
ing, holders of 49 per cent of stock can elect four out of
nine directors. The owners of 51 per cent of the shares, no
matter how they marshal their votes, will be able to elect
no more than five out of nine directors.'
Thus, with cumulative voting freely operating, share-
holders can attain representation on corporate boards that
is approximately proportionate to the number of shares
they own.
III
PREVALENCE OF CUMULATIVE VOTING
IN THE FORTY-EIGHT STATES
Following the lead of Illinois, cumulative voting in cor-
porate elections has been made mandatory by constitu-
tional provision in twelve other states6 and by statute in
5 The number of shares needed to elect a single director (X) under
cumulative voting can be found by taking the total number of shares
voting (Y) divided by one more than the number of directors to be
elected (N plus 1) and adding one share to this quotient. Thus:
X - y plus 1.
N plus 1
Using a nine-man board and percentage figures for the number of shares
voting:
X.-100%
9 plus 1 plus 1 = 10% plus 1 share.
This formula is found in WILLnsms, CUMULATV VOTING FOR DmsCTORs 41
(1951).
6 ARiz. CoNsT. art. 14, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. 11, § 4; KY. CoNsT. §
207; Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 194; Mo. CONST. art. 11, § 6; MoNT. CONST. art.
XV, § 4; NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 5; N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 135; PA. CONST.
art. 16, § 4; S.C. CONST. art. 9, § 11; S.D. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 5; W. VA. CONST.
art. XI, § 4.
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seven additional states.7
Statutes in twenty states" make cumulative voting per-
missive. In the latter states cumulative voting must be
provided for in the charter of the corporation if it is to be
utilized at all.
Permissive cumulative voting has proven to be an in-
effectual device. When a corporation is initially chartered
it is highly unlikely that the organizing group will volun-
tarily provide for cumulative voting in the certificate of
incorporation. They have little incentive to provide future
shareholders with the means to unseat directors represent-
ing the controlling interest, i.e., themselves. As time goes
on it is also highly improbable that the stockholders in
control of the corporation who can elect the entire board
of directors will permit an amendment to the certificate of
incorporation to be adopted which would allow the minor-
ity to gain representation through cumulative voting.
In short, if the principle of minority representation is a
good one it requires implementation by mandatory law,
either constitutional or statutory, and should not be left
to the mercy of the majority shareholder group who are
hardly ideal custodians of the rights of their dissatisfied
brethren.9
7 Am. STAT. ANx. § 64-224 (1947); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2235 (1953);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3303 (1949); MIcH. STAT. ANu. § 21.32 (1937);
Omo GEN. CODE ANN. § 1701.58 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.32.070 (1952);
Wyo. CozBwP. STAT. ANN. § 44-109 (1945).
8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-4 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.10 (Supp. 1954); IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-207
(Burns 1955); LA. REV. STAT. § 12:32 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 39(3)
(1951); MIum. STAT. ANN. § 30126 (3) (1947); NEV. Corip. LAws § 1629 (1929);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:85 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:10-15 (1939);
N.M. STAT. AN. § 51-6-6 (1953); N.Y. STocK COP. LAw § 49; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-110 (1950); OxLA. STAT. AmN. tit. 18, § 1.68 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 57.170(4) (1953); R.I. GEm. LAws c. 116, § 23 (1938); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-313 (1955); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.29 (1955); VT. REV. STAT. § 5784
(1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 13-203 (1950).
9 In a study of cumulative voting undertaken by Professor Williams
of the Harvard Business School, it was found that in only "something
more than 10% of the corporations chartered in those states which provide
for permissive cumulative voting had the device been put into practice."
Williams, Cumulative Voting, 33 HARv. Bus. Rrv. 109 (1955).
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IV
THE EFFECT OF CLASSIFICATION OF
DIRECTORS ON CUMULATIVE VOTING
Cumulative voting, to paraphrase Chesterton's com-
ment on Christianity, has not failed; it just hasn't been
tried. In Illinois, two years after the adoption of the 1870
constitution, the state legislature passed the first of the
so-called "classification statutes" which have done so much
to devitalize cumluative voting in corporate elections. The
Illinois act ° provided that the shareholders by resolution
could divide the board of directors into three classes, the
term of office of the first class to expire in one year, that
of the second class in two years and that of the third class
in three years. This provision continued until 1921 when
the Illinois legislature provided that each class of directors
elected annually must consist of at least three directors."
In 1933 the legislature added a further provision that made
it possible to classify boards of directors without share-
holder approval, e.g., by director action alone.'2
Of twenty states that have mandatory cumulative vot-
ing, eight permit boards to be classified. 3 All of the twenty
states which provide for permissive cumulative voting
authorize staggered boards.'
The crippling effect that classified boards have on the
cumulative voting right is simple to demonstrate. In a
corporation with nine directors, all of whom stand for
election at each annual meeting, shareholders owning 10
10 ILL. Rnv. STAT. c. 25, § 6 (1872).
3 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 18 (1921).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, §§ 25, 34 (1933).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.35 (1955); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271.345(4)
(Baldwin 1955); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.315 (1949); MONT. RPv. CODES ANN.
§§ 15-402, 15-403 (1947); NEB. Rv. STAT. § 21-115 (1943); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 10-0508 (1943); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-403 (Purdon 1938); W. Va.
CODE AEN. § 3028 (1955).
14 See note 8 supra.
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per cent of the stock plus one share can elect one director.
If the board is so classified that only three of the nine di-
rectors are elected each year, 25 per cent of the stock plus
one share is required to elect a single director. Thus,
through the device of staggering terms, 250 per cent more
votes are necessary to gain one seat on the board than if
all directors were elected simultaneously.
Classification can be carried to even greater extremes.
If it is proper to elect classes of only three directors each
year why not only two?' 5 Then persons owning up to 33%
per cent of the shares would be unable to elect a single
director. If only two directors of an 18-man board were
elected annually, a minority group would have to have
33Y per cent of the shares plus one share to elect a direc-
tor, whereas if all directors were elected at once, a minority
of 5.3 per cent could gain representation.
Furthermore, since the legislatures in the states where
cumulative voting is made mandatory by constitutional
provision are invariably under no compulsion to provide
for annual elections or for terms of any specified duration,
a classification statute could theoretically be passed which
permits boards of directors with 18 or 27 members to have
one-ninth of the membership elected each year for terms
of nine years each. The election of a 27-man board could
thus be spread over 27 years. In such a case instead of a
minority with approximately 3.6 per cent of the shares being
able to elect a director, it would take 25 per cent. More-
over, under such circumstances the owners of 75 per
cent of the shares could not gain control of the board in
less than 21 years. These examples are extreme but they
illustrate one glaring fact about classified boards: once
15 The proponents of staggered terms concede, as indeed they must,
that under cumulative voting it is improper to elect only one director a
year since it is not possible to cumulate at all under such circumstances.
The courts have so held. Wright v. Central California Water Co., 67 Cal.
532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885); Humphrys v. Winous Co., 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio App.
1955).
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the principle of classification is held to be compatible with
the constitutional right of cumulative voting the legisla-
ture has it within its power to reduce the right to practical
impotence. It is no answer to say that the legislatures
would not subject the right to such mutilation. Constitu-
tions are enacted to relieve legislatures from any such
temptation.
Once the people of a state have determined that cumula-
tive voting is of sufficient importance to provide for it in the
basic law, is it likely that they intended the right to be sub-
ject to the limitations and restrictions mentioned above,
or is it more probable that they intended that minority
shareholders should have the opportunity to gain repre-
sentation on the directorate proportional to their share-
holdings? Proportional representation versus any repre-
sentation at all thus becomes the pivotal issue in any anal-
ysis of the propriety of staggered boards in the context
of a constitutionally protected right. For eighty-three
years the question had not arisen in Illinois, and had re-
ceived scant judicial attention elsewhere.1"
Certain commentators, and principally Professor
Charles M. Williams of the Harvard Business School, had
called attention to the essential antagonism that existed
between cumulative voting and classified boards. In his
revealing monograph, Cumulative Voting for Directors,
Williams states that: 17
18 In an unreported decision, Hepps v. Byers Co., No. 10, Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Allegheny Co. Pa., April, 1950, a Pennsylvania lower court
denied a preliminary injunction on constitutional and other grounds on
an application that challenged the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
classification statute. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground that a reviewing court will not upset a preliminary injunction if
there are apparently reasonable grounds to support it. The court went on
to say it would not further discuss the merits of the case. Cohen v. Byers
Co., 363 Pa. 618, 70 A.2d 837 (1950).
In another unreported case in Pennsylvania, a three-judge court in
Allegheny County, had expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania classification statute. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92
PrrTs. LEGAL J. 464, 465 (1944).
17 WLLIAIMs, CUM1ThATIrE VonxG FOR DmscroRs 48-49 (1951).
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Efforts to limit the impact of cumulative voting have
taken the form of measures designed to prevent
election of opposition candidates and of restrictions upon
the influence of successful minority candidates as di-
rectors. Those who would like to curb the ambitions
of minority groups have found classification of di-
rectors an effective limitation on the use of cumulative
voting. Classified or staggered boards are usually
established through enactment of a bylaw dividing
the directors into, say, three classes. Customarily, at
the first election under the classified provision, direc-
tors of one class are elected for, say, three-year terms,
those of the second class for two, and of the third for
one. Thereafter, each class is elected for full three-year
terms, so that the directors of only one class come up
for election each year.
Hence, by reducing the number of candidates up
for election each year, classification effectively limits
the ability of minority groups to take advantage of
cumulative voting. It does not eliminate the right in a
technical sense; in a practical sense, nevertheless, it
can make the right an empty one for all but very
strong minority groups.
Considering the age of the constitutional provisions on
cumulative voting and the obviously destructive effects of
classification on the voting right, it seems odd that the is-
sue of the constitutionality of staggered terms had not been
squarely put to the courts long ago. Wolfson v. Avery, 8
which involved the method of electing directors at Mont-
gomery Ward & Company, an Illinois corporation, proved
to be the first definitive case.
V
THE MONTGOMERY WARD CASE
In the year 1945, Montgomery Ward & Company had 13
directors, all of whom were elected to office annually.
18 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
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That year a considerable amount of. stockholder unrest
and general dissatisfaction with management policies be-
came evident. On March 2, 1945 the board of directors
met and .using its power to amend the by-laws without
shareholder approval"9 increased the number of directors
from 13 to 15. Two months later, without any explanation
to shareholders, the by-laws were again amended so as
to provide, pursuant to the provisions of section 35 of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act2" for the election of 15
directors by classes, one-third of whom were to be elected
annually for three-year terms.
In 1948 strong opposition to the management of Mont-
gomery Ward developed on the board itself. The president
of the company, every vice-president and two directors
resigned.2 ' The board of directors promptly amended the
by-laws again to reduce the board to 12 with four direc-
tors to be elected annually. In the following year the board
was reduced to nine members with one-third of the mem-
bership to be elected each year. This was the minimum
size the board could take under Illinois law if the mem-
19 Section 25 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
c. 32, § 157.25 (1955), gives such power to the board alone unless the
charter reserves it to the shareholders which, in the case of Montgomery
Ward, it did not.
20 ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32, § 157.35 (1955). This section reads as follows:
"When the board of directors shall consist of nine or more
members, in lieu of electing the whole number of directors an-
nually, the by-laws may provide that the directors be divided
into either two or three classes, each class to be as nearly equal
in number as possible, the term of office of directors of the first
class to expire at the first annual meeting of shareholders after
their election, that of the second class to expire at the second annual
meeting after their election, and that of the third class, if any,
to expire at the third annual meeting after their election. At each
annual meeting after such classification the number of directors
equal to the number of the class whose term expires at the time of
such meeting shall be elected to hold office until the second succeed-
ing annual meeting, if there be two classes, or until the third suc-
ceeding annual meeting, if there be three classes."
21 For an interesting commentary on this period of Montgomery Ward's
corporate life, see AMRICAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, The Corporate
Director, in 4 BACKGROUND STUDIES IN MANAGEMENT ACTION, MONTGOMIERY
WARD & Co. (1954).
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bers were to be elected for. staggered terms.2
. The effect of the foregoing. amendments on the .cumula-
tive voting rights of Montgomery Ward shareholders was
devastating. In 1945, with 15 directors being elected an-
nually, shareholders with 6% per cent of the shares could
have cumulated their votes and elected one director. But
in 1949 with the board staggered and reduced to nine
members, the percentage of votes necessary to gain a sin-
gle seat had been increased to 25 per cent. Thus the effect
of the by-law changes was to make it 250 per cent more
difficult in 1949 for the minority to elect a director than
it had been in 1945. All this had been accomplished, it is
worth repeating, without any shareholder approval. More-
over, had the shareholders of Montgomery Ward wished
to abolish the staggered board because of its enfeebling
effect on their cumulative voting rights they could not
have done so without first getting the approval of the in-
cumbent board of directors-the very group who had an
interest in preserving staggered terms! The reason for
this strange state of affairs lay, of course, in the power to
amend the by-laws. This was lodged in the directors. So
long as it continued there the staggered board could not
be eliminated. But to take the power to amend the by-laws
away from the directors and give it to the shareholders
required an amendment to the certificate of incorporation'
This could not be accomplished under Illinois law unless
the board of directors first passed a resolution recommend-
ing such an amendment to the shareholders.2"
Thus the cumulative voting right, hailed as a great in-
novation in corporate democracy in 1870, had in the state
of its birth reached a stage of dreary desuetude. In a huge
industrial enterprise like Montgomery Ward with approx-
imately 68,000 shareholders and 6,700,000 shares of stock
22 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.35 (1955).
23 ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32, § 157.53 (1955).
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outstanding, the replacement of an existing board of di-
rectors had in the words of one jurist become "virtually
impossible."2
In August of 1954 an insurgent group of shareholders
led by Louis E. Wolfson announced that they were launch-
ing a proxy contest for control of Montgomery Ward. On
October 11, 1954 Mr. Wolfson wrote to the directors of
the company and demanded that the directors: (1) repeal
the by-law of the company which provided for staggered
terms, and (2) announce forthwith to the shareholders
that all directors would stand for election at the annual
meeting of shareholders to be held on April 22, 1955.
Counsel for the company replied and stated, in effect,
that the management declined to follow Mr. Wolfson's
recommendations. An action was promptly commenced in
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois by Mr. Wolfson
against the directors of Montgomery Ward25 in which a
declaratory judgment was sought adjudging that section
35 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act and the by-
law of Montgomery Ward providing for staggered terms
for directors were invalid and unconstitutional since they
contravened article XI, section 3 of the Illinois constitu-
tion.
The defendants' answer did not place any material fact
in issue. Only legal questions were before the court.
Plaintiff accordingly moved for judgment on the pleadings.
The ultimate legal question before the trial court and
later the Supreme Court of Illinois"- was, of course, the
meaning to be ascribed to the constitutional language.
This, in turn, according to traditional canons of constitu-
tional interpretation, depended on the intention of the
21 Judge Harry Fisher of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, the
trial judge in Wolfson v. Avery.
25 The company was also joined as a party.
26 Since a constitutional issue was involved, an appeal lay directly from
the trial court to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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adopters who voted in favor of the 1870 constitution.2
Although each side contended that the constitutional lan-
guage was clear and supported its respective position,
neither was willing to rest its case on the language point
alone. Since there were no reported judicial decisions that
bore upon the precise question before the court, the legal
argument necessarily turned to historical data (including
the constitutional debates and contemporaneous comments
in the public press), the long years (83) of legislative
construction that the constitutional provision had experi-
enced, the practical effect of staggered boards on the cu-
mulative voting right, the experience of other states with
cumulative voting and classified boards, the widespread
use of classified boards in corporate life and the supposed
upheaval that would result if classification should be held
to be unconstitutional.
The critical wording in the constitutional section pro-
vided that in all elections for directors, "... every stock-
holder shall have the right to vote.., for as many persons
as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to cu-
mulate [his] . .. shares, and give one candidate as many
votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number
of his shares. .. "'
The defendants contended that the phrase "directors or
managers to be elected" contemplated the possibility that
less than the whole number of directors can be elected at
any particular meeting of shareholders; hence classifica-
tion was admissible. The plaintiff countered with the argu-
ment that the phrase "directors... to be elected," standing
alone, is neutral in its implications and is consistent with
either of the alternatives of electing the entire board or a
part of it at any given time. To speak of "directors . . .
to be elected," said plaintiff, is merely to describe a future
27 Graham v. Dye, 308 IMI. 283, 139 N.E. 390, 391 (1923); City of Beards-
town v. City of Virginia, 76 111. 34, 41 (1875).
28 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
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event. It is natural to refer to "Congressmen to be elected"
or "automobiles to be manufactured" without implying
that less than all are being mentioned. Moreover, since
corporate boards may vary in size, the phrase "to be
elected" provides the flexibility necessary for such varia-
tions. Arguing that the constitutional provision must be
read as a whole, the plaintiff contended that when the
mechanics of cumulative voting are described it is pro-
vided that a shareholder may multiply the number of his
shares by "the number of directors." The latter phrase,
argued the plaintiff, meant the whole number of direc-
tors. 9 Thus, it was the whole number who were "to be
elected." The defendants argued that it was more logical to
read "number of directors" as having reference to the
earlier phrase "directors or managers to be elected"; there-
fore, the election of the entire board at one time was not
required.
In such a slippery problem of constitutional construction
resort must obviously be had to aids other than the con-
ventional canons. Each side found considerable support
for its position in historical fact.
The constitutional debates in Illinois in 1869-1870 gave
support to a principal contention of plaintiff that the
cumulative voting provision was intended to give minority
shareholders representation on boards of directors pro-
portionate to their voting strength. If this proposition
could be sustained, it would follow that all directors would
have to be elected simultaneously, since proportional rep-
resentation is not attainable at any election in which only
part of the board stands for office.3"
29 The plaintiff further contended that since "number of shares" clearly
refers to all shares owned by the shareholder, "number of directors" can
hardly mean less than all.
30 Whether all or a portion of the board is being elected, cumulative
voting operates to give the minority its approximate proportion of the
number of seats being contested. The crucial question thus became whether
the Illinois constitutional provision guaranteed minority shareholders their
proportion of the whole board or merely a part of it.
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Joseph Medill, the leading advocate of cumulative vot-
ing for both corporate and political elections, had stated to
the convention:
Suppose a company with a capital stock of $100,000,
elect ten directors. At present, under the ordinary
method of electing directors, stockholders holding five
hundred and one shares elect the entire board, and
those holding four hundred and ninety shares can-
not elect a man to represent their interests. After these
ten directors are thus elected, they can proceed to
create an "executive committee", to run the institution,
the members of which may not represent a quarter or
a fifth of the stock. Thus we have the whole interests
of the company controlled by $25,000 or $30,000 of
stock.
On the plan here proposed the holders of $49,000
by clubbing their votes together could elect four of
the ten directors, and if shares to the amount of $10,000
were held by one stockholder he could elect one
director to protect his interests .... 31
Another delegate of prominence, Mr. Coolbaugh, told
the assembly:
The principle is precisely this: If I am an individual
owner of one third of this capital stock of an incor-
poration organized for pecuniary profit, it would en-
able me to have representation in the board of direc-
tors equal to my interest in the stock of that corpora-
tion. For instance, if a company is organized with a
capital stock of $100,000, with nine directors, and I
am the owner of one third of the aggregate capital
of that company, I will have the privilege of electing
three of those directors, and have an influence on that
board of directors equal to my interest in the company.
32
On May 14, 1870, an editorial in the Chicago Tribune,"
which was published by Medill, had this to say about the
31 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF TBE CoNsTrrUIoNAL CoNIVNTIoN oF THE
STATE OF ILLI ois 1666 (1870).
32 Id. at 1667.
33 Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1870.
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cumulative voting provision:
In all incorporated companies every stockholder
shall have the privilege of voting as heretofore, for as
many Directors as are to be elected, or of casting the
whole number of his shares, multiplied by the whole
number of Directors, for any one person, or to other-
wise distribute them as he pleases. (Emphasis added.)
On June 25, 1870, a week before the people voted on the
new constitution, another editorial in the Chicago Trib-
une34 stated:
By the adoption of the section in question, the
minority will always be able, by concentrating their
votes, to elect as many Directors as their proportion of
shares would fairly entitle them to. Thus if a company
with a capital of $1,300,000 elects a board of thirteen
Directors, the minority, if they control $600,000 of the
stock, can elect six of the thirteen Directors. If they
control but $100,000 they can still elect one Director to
look after their interests in the management of the
affairs of the company. The selfishness, rapacity, and mis-
management of corporate bodies and the secrecy, in-
trigue, and corruption in the proceedings of their officers
will receive a healthy and salutary check.
Two days before ratification, the Chicago Tribune' edi-
torialized on the Erie Railroad scandal in these words:
The third clause [of Article XI of the new constitu-
tion] on "Corporations" will forever prevent the con-
fiscations of the rights of stockholders by Directors, of
which the Erie Railway is a conspicuous and infamous
example. . . . Now, if the four-ninths of Erie stock
actually held by the opponents of Fisk and Gould,
prior to the fraudulent over-issues, had been allowed
its fair representation in the Board of Directors, as
provided by our new Illinois Constitution, the Gould-
Fisk party, instead of electing the vhole board, would
only have elected five-ninths of them, while the other
party would have had immediately four-ninths of them
in the Board of Directors, and a minority in the Execu-
34 Id. June 25, 1870.
35 Id. June 30, 1870.
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tive Committee.... This will, at all times, enable the
holders of any given minority of the stock to elect a
number of Directors proportionate to their number
of shares of stock....
Another Illinois newspaper, 6 prior to the vote, spoke
of the cumulative voting provision as making it possible
for minority shareholders to always "elect a minority of
directors proportioned to its strength." Still another jour-
nal37 contrasted "monopoly representation" with "propor-
tional or minority representation" as provided in the new
constitution. On July 6, 1870, the Bloomington Panta-
graph commented that cumulative voting ". . . is right in
principle; for minorities are entitled to representation in
proportion to their numbers.... "'
The plaintiff argued that the foregoing excerpts from
the debates and from the contemporaneous press, as well
as others published immediately prior to adoption of the
constitution, were proper for the court to consider, citing,
among authorities, Cohens v. Virginia,"' which spoke of
the great weight courts had always attached to the Fed-
eralist writings of Madison, Hamilton and Jay in which the
merits of the new federal constitution were expounded.
The defendants, for their part, pointed to the fact that
staggered boards had been used extensively in Illinois
corporations prior to 1870;40 that in 1872 the first legisla-
ture that met after the adoption of the constitution had
adopted a statute permitting staggered boards;' and that
36 Edwardsville Intelligencer, June 9, 1870.
37 Chicago Evening Post, June 22, 1870.
38 Bloomington Pantagraph, July 6, 1870.
39 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418-19 (1820).
40 Most of the corporations in which classifications had been employed
in Illinois prior to 1870 were non-stock companiem All were incorporated
by special legislative act.
43 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 25, § 6 (1872). The Illinois legislature in the first
classification statute placed no limitation, however, on the size of the classes
of directors. Thus, it was theoretically possible for a class to be composed of
one person - a practice that would completely nullify cumulative voting.
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13 members of the 1872 legislature had been members of
the constitutional convention. The defendants placed
heavy reliance on such "contemporaneous construction,"
as the most persuasive evidence of what was intended by
the constitutional language.42
Defendants further observed that in numerous states
besides Illinois, cumulative voting and classification of
directors are permitted to co-exist.43 Moreover, defendants
pointed out, Congress has provided for cumulative voting
and classified boards for Federal Reserve Banks, Federal
Savings and Loan Associations, and National Farm Loan
Associations. Additionally, The Model Business Corpora-
tion Act prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws contains similar provisions.
The defendants also called the court's attention to the
fact that out of approximately 1000 corporations whose
shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 142
corporations elect their directors by classes, and of these,
61, or 43 per cent, employ cumulative voting in the
election of directors.
Thus, argued defendants, a very large and respectable
body of legislative and professional opinion in this country
believes that no inherent inconsistency exists between
cumulative voting and classified boards.
As the argument proceeded it became apparent that the
transcendent issue in the case was whether the constitu-
tional provision was intended to afford minority sharehold-
ers proportional representation on corporate boards or
merely some representation. The defendants vigorously
urged upon both courts the proposition that the constitu-
tional mandate was satisfied if shareholders could get a
42 Plaintiff argued that the 1872 legislature has shown itself not to be
particularly sure-footed in corporate matters by adopting a statut3 which per-
mitted directors to fill vacancies on corporate boards, a practice ruled
unconstitutional fifty-eight years later in People ex rel. Weber v. Cohn,
339 Ill. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930).
43 See notes 13 and 14 supra.
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single "watch-clog" director on a board. Such representa-
tion, it was said, would have curbed the excesses and
rapacity of the "rings" which had so agitated the people
in 1870, and would have adequately protected the minority
interest. Proportional representation, in defendant's view,
was never intended since the size of corporate boards was
left to the discretion of the legislature. If the legislature
had the power to provide that all corporations shall have
three directors, (thus requiring a vote of 25 per cent plus 1
share to elect a single director) it could with equal logic,
permit three directors out of nine to be elected annually.
Moreover, the argument ran, the legislature could consti-
tutionally provide that corporate elections need be held
only once every three years. If the legislature adopted
such a statute, a minority of 25 per cent plus 1 share would
have to wait three years to elect a director. Why, therefore,
should such a minority be heard to complain that it can
elect only one director to a nine-man board if it can ulti-
mately elect three directors (more than its fair proportion)
by voting in three successive annual meetings?
The plaintiff's rebuttal to the foregoing points - it must
be conceded that they were not without persuasiveness -
was that a three-man board and a nine-man board are
not the same thing. If a corporation such as Montgomery
Ward because of its size and complexity believes it needs
nine directors to run its affairs efficiently, the minority is
entitled to its fair share of the nine. The corporation should
not be permitted to function with a board of nine but for
purposes of cumulative voting "make believe" it has a
board of three. As for the contention that minority share-
holders with at least 25 per cent of the shares may gain
proportionate (or even greater) representation by voting
in three successive elections, the plaintiff argued that
representation in futuro is not what the constitution con-
templated but rather representation now. If a situation
exists within management which a minority group is dis-
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satisfied with, it hardly satisfies their grievance to tell
them that ff they wait patiently for three years they may
ultimately be able to make their voices heard.
The lower court granted plaintiff's motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings and declared section 35 of the Il-
linois Business Corporation Act and the by-law of the
company which provided for a classified board both to be
invalid and in conflict with the constitutional right. On
direct appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, with
six justices joining in the majority opinion and one dis-
senting.
The court squarely faced the problems of interpretation
involved in the constitutional language. The phrase " . . .
directors ... to be elected.. ."" was not intended, in the
court's view, to imply that less than the whole board could
be elected at one time. On the contrary, the language of
the second clause of the constitutional section which gives
a stockholder as many votes as ". . . the number of direc-
tors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock.. ."
requires the election of all directors at once. Given their
normal and natural meaning the words "number of di-
rectors" mean the whole number. If the constitutional con-
vention meant anything less it should have used qualifying
language.
The appellants and various amici curiae" had urged in
argument that since staggered boards were not expressly
prohibited by the constitution they should be deemed to
be allowed under the familiar doctrine that the legislature
is the repository of all power not placed elsewhere by the
constitution. The court reacted to this argument with the
observation that the constitutional guaranty of minority
representation prohibits any legislative act which in effect
44 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
45 Ibid.
46 Several Illinois corporations whose classified boards would be affected
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nullifies or defeats the constitutional right. The court
pointed out that the constitutional language does not ex-
pressly forbid the filling of vacancies by directors, or the
issuance of non-voting stock, yet statutes authorizing such
practices have been held invalid in Illinois.4' The greatly
increased percentage of stock necessary to obtain any
representation on a board which results from classification
is, in effect, an impairment of the constitutional right and
hence prohibited by necessary implication.
The court seems to have been strongly influenced by the
explanation of the constitutional provision given by its
sponsors at the constitutional convention and by the ex-
position that the section received in the press in 1870. The
excesses of corporate managements in the 1860's, the
mood of public indignation that hung over the conven-
tion, and the obvious good sense of judging the scope of
the reform in terms of the mischief sought to be remedied,
led the court to the conclusion that the people intended
that minority shareholders should have representation
that is proportionate to their voting strength.
The court was not impressed with the arguments that
since classified boards had existed in Illinois for eighty-
three years they should be tenderly regarded. It pointed
to several other practices which had been struck down in
the past and which had had the sanction of history,4" and
remarked that "age ... does not immunize a statute from
constitutional attack."4
Nor was the court greatly influenced by the fact that the
by the ruling in the instant case were allowed to file amicus briefs.
47 People ex 7el. Weber v. Cohn, 339 IMI. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930); People
ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emerson, 302 M. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922).
48 People v. Bruner, 343 M. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931), holding invalid a
statute enacted in 1827 making jurors the judges of the law as well as of
the facts in criminal cases; People ex rel. Weber v. Cohn, 339 IM. 121, 171
N.E. 159 (1930), invalidating the practice of directors filling vacancies on
corporate boards; Grasse v. Dealers Transport Co., 412 Il. 179, 106 N.E.2d
124 (1952), holding invalid a forty-year old section of the Worknen's
Compensation Act.
94- Wolfson v. Avery, 6 IM. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701, 711 (1955).
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1872 legislature, only two years after the constitutional
convention, had adopted a classification statute. While such
legislative construction was entitled to "some weight," in
this instance, said the court, "it must yield to the evidence
supplied by the constitutional debates and the contem-
porary accounts in the press.
'5°
The appellants and certain of the amici curiae had pre-
dicted alarming results in our corporate life if classified
boards should be held invalid. The integrity of commer-
cial transactions and the rights of innocent third parties
dealing with the corporation would be placed in serious
jeopardy, it was said. Such fears, the court held, were un-
warranted, since directors exercising the function of their
office under color and claim of an election are de facto
directors whose acts, so far as third parties are concerned,
are as binding upon the corporation as if the directors were
de jure.3 '
VI
THE EFFECT OF THE MONTGOMERY
WARD DECISION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
What effect, if any, the decision in Wolfson v. Avery will
have in other jurisdictions will depend on the degree of
protection that is given corporate cumulative voting in any
given state. In those states in which cumulative voting is
made mandatory or permissive by statute and classified
boards are permissive, the decision should have no judicial
repercussions at all.2 In such states the legislatures have
seen fit to give shareholders a right that is conditioned at
its birth by the classification device. Since shareholders
in those states had no right to vote their shares cumulative-
50 Ibid.
5: Id. at 711-712.
52 See notes 7 and 8 supra.
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ly before the legislature acted, they cannot now complain
that the right they have received does not permit them to
secure proportional representation. What the legislature
can give the legislature can water down.
For those states in which the cumulative voting right
is constitutionally protected and classification is permit-
ted, the Montgomery Ward decision has obviously greater
relevance. Here, of course, the constitutional language
must be carefully scrutinized. The cumulative voting pro-
visions in Montana,5" Nebraska5 5 and West Virginia56 are
substantially the same as the Illinois57 provision. The word-
ing of the Kentucky,5" Missouri, North Dakota,6" South
Dakota 1 and Pennsylvania62 provisions is different from
Illinois in certain respects that could be material. The Mis-
souri constitution, for instance, provides that each share-
holder shall have the right to cast ".... as many votes in-
the aggregate as shall equal the number of shares held
by him, multiplied by the number of directors or managers
to be elected.... ."' Does the insertion of the phrase "to be
elected" after "number of directors"64 have any control-
ling significance? It is submitted that it should not.' It
53 See note 6 supra.
54 MoNT. CoNsT. art. XV, § 4.
55 NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
56 W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
51 ILL. Co NsT. art. XI, § 3.
58 Ky. CONST. § 207.
59 Mo. CONST. art. 11, § 6.
60 N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 135
61 S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 5.
62 PA. CONST. art. 16, § 4.
63 See note 59 supra.
64 It will be remembered that this, in effect, was the way the defendants
in the Montgomery Ward litigation asked the courts to construe the Illinois
constitutional provision.
65 Many of the comments that have appeared to date in the law
journals on Wolfson v. Avery have shown an intense preoccupation with the
constitutional language, and especially with the phrase "directors or
managers to be elected" occurring in the first part of the constitutional
section. For analyses which, to the writer, place more stress on semantics
than on the purposes of the constitutional reform, see: 69 HAv. L. REv. 380
(1955); 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 112 (1955); 30 ST. Jom's L. REv. 83 (1955); 11
THE BusmEss LAwYER 31, 36 (1955); 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (1955); 1955
U. ILL. FORUm 323.
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seems highly fanciful to contend that the people of a state
in adopting such a provision 80 years ago when corporate
law was in its infancy had in mind the possibility of stag-
gered director terms or the effect which they would have
on the cumulative voting right. The probability is that
staggering never occurred to them nor to the persons who
drafted the provision. In such a situation, the task that
confronts a court is not so much that of determining what
the framers and adopters intended, but what they would
have intended had they thought of the problem.
Constitutional provisions are to be interpreted in... m a
broad and liberal spirit."6 They are drawn to be intelli-
gible to the average citizen not merely to corporation
lawyers. The cumulative voting provision in Illinois was
plainly intended to give minorities the opportunity for
representation on corporate boards. It has no other pur-
pose. It presupposes a body of stockholder opinion that
disagrees with the way an incumbent board of directors
is conducting the business. It believes that the presence
of minority directors will have a corrective and salutary
influence on corporate practices. These were the thoughts,
if the history of the times is to be believed, which were
uppermost in the minds of the framers and adopters of
the constitutional provision. The right was thought im-
portant enough to put it beyond the reach of the legislature.
If we assume, therefore, a strong public policy in favor
of minority representation in corporate matters (other-
wise why express it in a constitution?) the question logi-
cally occurs whether such a policy is furthered or impeded
by classification of directors. If shareholders owning 49
per cent of the stock have serious disagreement with the
management, is the public policy in favor of minority
representation given its due if the 49 per cent can elect
only one director out of nine? Let us suppose there are
66 People v. Lewis, 375 IMI. 330, 31 N.E,2d 795, 796 (1940).
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two minority groups each with approximately 20 per cent
of the shares? Is it rational or just to deny them any
representation whatever on a board of nine and at the
same time permit the 60 per cent majority to elect the
entire directorate? It should be kept firmly in mind that
once the principle of proportional representation is re-
jected no group can be under-represented without another
group being over-represented.
Whether the doctrine of Wolfson v. Avery will be fol-
lowed in the other "constitutional" states will ultimately
depend upon the inherent importance that courts attach
to minority representation. With precedent so sparse, with
the constitutional language often flexible enough to per-
mit a court to define the cumulative voting right either
sympathetically or hostilely, with historical factors often
evenly balanced, the decisions will inevitably turn upon
policy considerations of the broadest and most philosophic
kind.
Once the right of the minority to any representation is
acknowledged, it would seem to follow logically that it is
entitled to representation commensurate with its holdings,
unless there is some strong, overriding public policy that
makes this result socially undesirable. This leads one to
inquire about the social usefulness of classified boards.
VII
THE MERITS OF CLASSIFIED
BOARDS
The usual justification for classified boards is that they
promote "continuity of management." If this phrase means
anything, it must mean that by electing directors to stag-
gered terms it makes it impossible for the shareholders to
turn the entire board out of office at any one election.
Hence, no matter how great the upheaval, there will al-
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ways be some persons on the board from the year before.
Being familiar with the operations of the business, they
supply the "continuity of management." In assaying this
argument let us pass the point that perhaps shareholders
who want a wholly new board of directors should be able
to have one. Let us also forget, for the moment, that classi-
fication, whether accompanied by straight or cumulative
voting, makes it prohibitively expensive for almost any
dissatisfied group of shareholders ever to challenge the
management since at least two annual proxy contests are
required for a majority to gain control. We may also, for
the moment, ignore the obvious point that "continuity of
management" may mean continuity of poor management
as well as good.
The "continuity of management" argument still lacks
substance in the context of corporate elections with cumu-
lative voting. If all directors are elected at once under
straight voting, it is true that shareholders owning 51 per
cent of the votes can elect an entirely new (and perhaps
inexperienced) board at any given annual election. But,
except in the rarest of cases, this is precisely what does not
happen with cumulative voting freely operating. The in-
surgents may marshal enough votes to become the ma-
jority but some of the incumbents will then comprise the
minority. Each of the rival groups will gain representation
proportionate to its strength. Some person or persons from
the prior board of directors will be continued in office un-
less (assuming a board of nine members) the dissident ma-
jority owns more than 90 per cent of the shares." Thus,
"continuity of management" in the best sense of the term
is promoted by cumulative voting unhampered by the clas-
sification device.
The only other justification heard for classification of
67 If they do, why should they not elect the whole board? Put otherwise:
why should a 10 per cent minority be able to block the 90 per cent majority
from control for two years?
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directors is that the device makes it more difficult for "out-
siders" to gain control of a corporation for their own
selfish interests.
One prominent member of the bar put the matter as
follows in an address to the American Bar Association
last summer:
While the advantages of continuity of management
must be given weight, the advantages or disadvantages
of a classified board will be judged primarily on the
basis of one's views as to whether it should be made
harder or easier for persons seeking to obtain control
of management to do so. Cumulative voting is favored
by many because it permits a minority to obtain
representation on a board of directors. Classification of
directors makes it harder to obtain such representation
because it takes more stock to elect one director out of
three than to elect one out of nine. However, the more
important question, I think, is whether the path of
those seeking to oust a management should be made
smoother. I have included "Corporate Democracy" in
the title of this discussion because I do not believe that
public policy requires, for the protection of stock-
holders' interests, proportionate representation for mi-
norities, or that public policy should forbid reasonable
limitations on stockholders' rights to overthrow a man-
agement or even to obtain representation on a board.0 8
The foregoing passage, admirable in its frankness, lays
bare the fundamental issue. That issue is not the com-
patibility of staggered boards and cumulative voting. It is
rather whether minority representation is per se a good
or bad thing. There are those who contend that in most
instances cumulative voting is used by a dissident group
of shareholders who aspire to a seat on a corporate board
merely to "raid" the corporation or to "rock the boat"
or for some other base purpose. If the major premise is
that cumulative voting produces more evil than good, it
follows that any device such as classification which cuts
08 Address by Leonard D. Adkins, Corporate Democracy and Classified
Boards, ABA Annual Meeting, August, 1955.
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down its effectiveness should have judicial sanction. What-
ever else may be said of the philosophy of keeping the
"ins" in and the "outs" out one thing is certain: it was not
the philosophy that animated the people who wrote the
cumulative voting right into the state constitutions some
eighty years ago.
Who, it may be asked, is to be the judge of the motives
of two rival shareholder groups? It is suggested that if the
shareholder's vote is to have any meaning, the resolution
of any such controversy must be left to him, fallible and
unsophisticated though he may be. Democratic procedures
whether in corporate or political matters often produce
abuses and injustices but no system has ever been found
to protect the voter from his own weaknesses which has
not ultimately destroyed his freedom. Classification may
sometimes prevent the unscrupulous from being elected
to corporate office. But it may more often keep an incom-
petent in office. Fundamentally, it is a wall built to protect
the directors from the shareholders and to protect share-
holders from themselves. Its social value is minimal and




Cumulative voting was intended to give representation
to minority shareholders on corporate boards of directors.
When given constitutional protection it reflects a strong
public policy in favor of the right and a disinclination to
leave its fate to legislative hands. Classification, as the court
found in Wolfson v. Avery, so weakens and vitiates cumu-
lative voting that it is unreasonable to suppose that the
framers and adopters of the constitutional provision in-
tended to permit it.
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The constitutional debates in Illinois and the contem-
porary comments in the press make it clear that cumula-
tive voting was intended to promote proportional repre-
sentation on corporate boards. The language of the Illinois
constitutional provision, while not entirely free from
ambiguity, should be read in the light of such contempo-
raneous exposition and of the evil sought to be remedied.
In states where the cumulative voting right is protected
only by statute and where classification is permitted,
Wolfson v. Avery should have little precedential effect. In
states other than Illinois where cumulative voting has con-
stitutional sanction the legality of classification will de-
pend in large degree upon the social usefulness which the
courts attach to minority representation. In such jurisdic-
tions, the decision in Wolfson v. Avery may have far-reach-
ing effects. Since Illinois was the progenitor of cumulative
voting in corporate elections, the historical factors which
the court found determinative in arriving at the intention
of the framers and adopters should have important influ-
ences elsewhere.
Cumulative voting, uninhibited by the classification de-
vice, results in proportionate representation for both
minority and majority groups and promotes "continuity
of management" in the classic sense of the term. Classifi-
cation, when coupled with cumulative voting, tends to
perpetuate present management and, in practical effect,
deprives minority interests of any representation what-
ever.
For several decades the voting rights of shareholders
have been subjected to a continuous process of erosion to
the point where "corporate democracy" has become an al-
most meaningless shibboleth. Non-voting stock, voting
trusts, classified boards, management's iron control of the
proxy machinery, the prohibitive cost of election contests,
the holding of annual meetings at inaccessible places
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these and comparable developments have all but reduced
the shareholder to an innocuous figurehead. The decision
in Wotlfson v. Avery, in some degree at least, narrows the
heretofore constantly widening gap between ownership
and control.
Edmund A. Stephan*
* Member of the firm of Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown &
:Platt, Chicago, Illinois.
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